TL2430 (1)

INDONESIA:

STRATAGIES FOR AN ANEXATION

Even though, during years, since its independence in 1945, the Republic of Idonesia had expressely declared that it did not have any territorial reivindications to make regarding East Timor, the fact is that the 25th of April brought about a question to which the military regime of Suharto had a clear response, generated out of its own experience and its own nature.

In a few months, the neighbouring country of East Timor, actioned a number of mechanisms, at political, diplomatic, military and security levels which aimed at creating the opportunity for a quick, efficient and painless anexation for the Javanese power.

Even the most experient and powerful can be mistaken. Not overlooking its central purposes, the Government of Jacarta have, to date, been forced to reformulate its intervention guide-lines in East Timor and in relation to the international community in order to face the forces which it had initially under estimated: the maubere nationalism and the international judicial principles, bases also of a solidarity between the peoples which is increasingly being expressed.

Young Nation, stage of social and political movements during the turning of the 50 to the 60 decade, its potentialities have been overcome at the hands of general Suharto, "nationalist" capable of conducting the massacre of hundreds of thousands of countrymen under the pretext of avoiding the "commu-

nist danger" and of building a "New Order". And so the javanese superiority and the military regime were imposed in their more exact expression, as it is the military who dominate and control the "civil society" in all its economic, political and socio-cultural activities, with unmensurable strictness and application.

The Indonesian expansionism springs out of this rage. Based on the position they occupy in the business world (150 milion of inhabitants, oil, member of OPEP, receiver of investments and considerable economic and military aid from several West countries and from Japan) and in the international solidarities from which they benefit (the biggest muslim country of teh world, founder member of the Non-Allegiance Movement), the leaders of Jacarta suffocate by the force of arms, all the emancipation expressions or of democracy.

After the occupation of West Papua, in 1963, the invasion of East Timor represents a step, different in terms of quality in the escalade: West Papua was integrated in the Indonesian Republic against the will of its inhabitants, but there was the pretext that the territory was part of the group of old Dutch colonies.

The instability created and contained by the force of the military power is a risk over which the generals of Jakart build their "New Order". In West Papua, the fight against the Indonesian authorities was re-activated in the last two years, the war in East Timor is still on after 10 years of occupation, in Java the social and religious conflicts have continued.

For the regime, once the intervention in East Timor was decided, this had to take place as quickly and efficiently as possible. Center of internal and external tension, corrosive example, it was also that Suharto tried to avoid, that is why in 1985 the main purpose of policy for "Tim-Tim" is still the same it was in 1975: ensure the complete integration of the"27th province of Indonesia" which implies for the maubere people, not only the refusal to their right to the history of their own, the definition of the future which is theirs, but also the submission to a totahitary repressive, vile and corrupt regime.
Therefore, with no future.

THE CURTAIN OF SILENCE

From the point of view of the external policy, the essential for the Indonesian Government will be to obtain the internation recognition, through ONU, of the East Timor annexation.

From the point of view of its policy for East Timor, the efforts are aimed to the "pacification" of the Rerritory, on one hand, and to its complete indonesianization, on the other, which means its integration in the socio-political, economic and cultural system of the Republic of Indonesia.

Both sides of the same coin are duly articulated. The isolation imposed to East Timor is one of the key points of this articulation, as it guarantees the impossibility of free access to the direct knowledge of what goes on in the territory and allows a skilful manipulation of information to the exterior, supported by a State machine which easily gains cre-

dibility against the news given by refugees, by members of the Church (who, for security reasons, cannot be identified) and by FRETILIN itself.

The information has been a fundamental weapon in this battle. Internally, the strict division and surveillance of the towns , and "strategic villages" where the populations live, the restrictions to free circulation, the intimidation and the daily terror, encumber the transmission of information and the global picture of the situation in the country. Verbally, the news travel hand in hand with fear and risk.

For the exterior all forms of control are used: refugees who leave know, and they are threatened at departure accordingly, that if they speak out, their relatives in East Timor will be subject to retaliations. The foreign delegations are carefully sellected, prepared and accompanied.

The purposes followed by the Indonesian regime in inviting foreign delegations to visit East Timor have not always been reached, even though this is one of the most efficient means of convincing, or supplying reasons, to Governments who may resist to give their open support to Jakarta. Whereas the trips by ambassadors or embassy officials living in the Indonesiam capital have resulted in general, positive for the regime, strengthening pre-existing commitments, the visits by parlamentary people or by jornalists have proved to be, inspite of precautions, much less easy. We should remember the case of the Australian parlamentary delegation at the end of the

cease-fire period (August 1983), which originated two contradictory reports, Bill Morrison's (1), favourable to the indonesians thesis, and G. Makintosh's, questioning the javanese occupation of East Timor. More recently, a West German parlamentary delegation expressed, when returning, the "impression that the whole island was a prison" (2) and asked the Indonesian auhtorities to close the camp of Atauro.

In the same way, three foreigh jornalists sisiting East Timor in february, 1985 end up by referring to the surveillance conditions to which they had been subjected and, at least one of them, Peter Millership, from REUTER, insists in publishing the declarations by Mons, Belo about the massacre of 84 timores, carried out by the Indonesian army near Kraras, inspite of the denials by the Governor, Mario Carrascalão.

All contacts are made in the presence of Indonesian military people, including the interviews granted by the apostolic administrator of Dili. The places to visit are sellected - even a few months ago the apostolic pro-nuncio in Jakart, travelling in East Timor, had his visits to Lospalos and Viqueque cancelled under the pretext that there was no helicopter available. Similar restrictions were imposed on Mons, Ximenes Belo.

Before the arrival of the Red Cross International Committee team (CICR), prisoners were taken out of the prisons and replaced by Indonesians, so that their appearance would be of well cared for people receiving good treatment. Such an operations also took place in the prison island of Atauro,

during Mons, Pablo Puente's visit as apostolic pro-nuncio in Jakarta.

All correspondence is censured, as stated by Mons. Belo in a letter to the French Justice and Peach Committee: "All mail of Timor is censured, Therefore, we have to make many efforts to find adequate means not to post our letters"(3) and this is even admitted by the American Department of State's report on the Rights of Man (4).

In Indonesia, "Tim-Tim" is presented as a peaceful and developing province, where important investments are made and where inaugurations are frequent. Censure also prevents the Indonesian people to notice the war or the reasons which turn the people of Timor against their invadors. Gilles Bertin, correspondent of FRANCE-PRESS Agency, saw his application for a visa refused by the authorities of Jakarta, at teh end of last year and had to return to Paris in December - he was one of the independent and well informed on the situations of Timor jornalist .

The Indonesian press plays also an important role in presenting an East Timor image suited to the wishes of the generals. An article published in Jakarta is largely used by the Javanese diplomacy and, when republished in other countries press, overcomes boarders and appears to carry credibility at the eyes of the world.

A POLITICAL AND CIVIC LIFE DOMINATED BY THE OCCUPATION ARMY

The Indonesian version about the present situation and the political statute of East Timor is well known. According to the occupier's claims, the Timor people have already h carried out their right to self determination, having chosen the integration in the Republic of Indonesia according to a process as per resolutions 1514. 1541 and 1265 of the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 1541, in particular, states that self-determination may be effected by integration in an idependent state). Such a process would have had to have the proclamation of the INTEGRASI by a Timor "provisional Government" on 30th November, 1975 (formed as a result of the coup of UDT on 11th August), culminating with a "Popular General Meeting" having taken place, pretensely representative of the Timor people, on 31st May of the following year. According to the Indonesian propaganda (5), such a General Meeting was constituted by two representatives for each of the thirteen administrative districts of East Timor (3, in the case of Dili), and 10 additional persons appointed by the "provisional Government". The most important decision of the "Popular General Meeting" would have been that of requesting the integration into the Indonesian State - which would have been effectively "approved" by the Indonesian DPR (parliament) on 15th July, 1976 and formalized in a decree by President Suharto two days later.

The nature of the "Popular General Meeting" assembled in May 1976 has never offered any doubts. According to James Dunn,

"what really happened was that some officials of the Indonesian secret services, in general accompanied by member of APODETI, called up local leaders and, in certain cases, simply ordered them to be members of the "General Meeting" (6). And someone so unsuspected as the Americal assistant secretary of State for South East and Pacific Affairs, John Hollbridge, stated in a parlamentary debate about East Timor in September 1982 that "...as far as we are concerned, there has been no valid act of self-determination" because "the provincial parliament was appointed by Indonesians and not elected".(7)

According to the Indonesian Government, the Timor people is not deprived of their political rights - they will have, for instance, participated fully in the last general election for national Parliament members in Jakarta and for the provincial Board of Dili. In this election, carried out in May 1982, about 300 thousand electors will have chosen 4 national deputees and 40 provincial representatives. Of the national votes, 99%(!) will have gone to GOLKAR, the political group of hegemonic military dominace in the Indonesian regime.

The idillical and unanimist official version of the election process of 1982 is confronted by testimonies coming from the interior, as for instance a document of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance dated January, 1985. In it the role played by the Armed Forces and the Idonesian security services is evoked in the seting up of the elections which had been "prepared" by training exercises such as the following extract illustrates: "During the tzo weeks prior to

the farce of the elections and, in some places, even the more dignified Indonesians sent from the "kodim" and representatives of the Indonesian "koramil" GOLKAR, Indonesian policemen and one or other native compensated with a motor bicycle or a radio, ordered the appearance of the whole population for an intensive daily training of "democratic elections", from 7.00 a.m. until noon. These scenes were repeated daily, and everywhere to the disgust and despise of the population itself, who were forced to transport the elderly, blind as well as the invalids.

Three ballot-boxes on top of one table, placing the one of GOLKAR in the centre and the adepts of GOLKAR who were not more than professional executioners in each pole "explained" so that there would be no doubts in the midst of the population, not to wrongly place the grain of corn or the little stone or the card, and only in the middle ballot-box. The population who already in 1977, during the period of the Resistance Bases, in the mountains, had also elected their village representatives, saw exactly the commedy they were being forced to play, and was anxious to quickly return to their own affairs, kept on placing the papers in the centre ballot-box, commenting also that there was no need to have the other two boxes placed there. However, on purpose and with the intention of further ridiculing that dispisable "Democratic Process", and "Electoral Education", there were also every day one or more "unawares" who had to face the threats and who lifted quite high the GOLKAR card, the only one that

had been distributed and placed it in one of the lateral ballot--boxes. The Indonesians moaned, threatened and made a note of the name of the dissidents and forced them to vote again.(8)

East Timor is today presented as the 27th Indonesian Province and its political and administrative structure follows the pattern of the remaining provinces: about 1.700 population agglomerations are distributed in 64 sub-dustricts (Kabujaten). But, differently to other Indonesian Administrative Regions the administration of East Timor is not under the responsability of the Department of Internal Affairs, but under the Department of Defense and Security. In this setting a Coordination Committee for the Administration of East Timor was constituted already in 1978 having as president General Murdani, and which is responsible for the critical administrative areas (security, political affairs, information and communication, population control and population transfers, labour and religious affairs), leaving for the local Government aspects such as primary education, health, public works, social affairs and agriculture.

A Governor is resposible for the Provincial Administration. But also here, contrary to what happens in all the Indonesian Provinces where the leader is normally in the milatary career, the East Timor Governor is civil (Mário Carrascalão, member of a family who owns coffee plantations and who has already been part of the permanent delegation of Indonesia in the United Nations, after 1975). This is explained possibly by the intention to present to the exterior a civilist farce

and of a symbolic sharing of the power with an internal minority supporting the integration. But the truth is that the effective power in the administration of Timor belongs to the Armed Forces of Indonesia - who apply in the "27th province" its doctrine of "dual funtion", simultaneously military and social, through a military commander (for war operations) and of a regional secretary (Sekwilde). O Sekwilde is a military officer (Colonel Kalangi, appointed in 1980) and the true responsible for the Government of East Timor. Under his orders, about thirty Indonesian officers occupy almost all the top functions of the Timor Administration. Furthermore, the administrative structure is doubled at all levels by a milatary command structure (Kodim, at district level, Koramil at sub-district level, etc.), while certain tasks of civil nature (labour licences or travel licences, identification, etc.) are controlled by the Koti the section in the Armed Forced in charge of security. (9)

As far as the approximately 6 500 public servants (10), mainly Timor people are concerned, they constitute a body without autonomy and are considered even by the Indonesian press redundant and inefficient.

The Catholic Church of East Timor has not failed to denounce this situation in its recent document referring to "the systematic occupation of key-posts in the public services by Indonesians, generally milatary, with the consequent gradual setting aside of the Timor people". (11)

REPOPULATION, TRANSMIGRATION AND PLANTATION ECONOMY

The already mentioned coument of the Apostolic Administrator of Dili refers to "the permanent insecurity of populations in many regions of the territory and the continuous exodus of the Timor people, the continuous internal forced migrations to the resettlements, to the lack of population circulation.." and still to the "concentration of populations in settlements (camps), in sub-human conditions, without the possibility of providing for themselves, cultivating their land, depending solely from the help which from time to time reaches them".

Since 1976, as a matter of fact, the traditional dispersed settlement of the Timor communities was disturbed by the forced resettlements by the invasor into especialized camps (daerah pemukiman). In terms of the Indonesian propaganda, this concerned a resettlement and development communitary programme, with the construction of new villages in places accessible to the means of communication, equipped with communatary centres, clinics, etc. . In fact, it is a programme of resettlement with political and milatary aims, which follows a plan of economic transformations which do not benefit the majority of the East Timor population.

The re-housings have separated many Timor people from the lands which they originally occupied and worked, depriving them of the food autonomy and subjecting them to "voluntary" work in agricultural labour (rice) programmed by the Indonesians or in the construction of infra-structures (roads, ca-

nals, etc.) - it is the gotong royong, the term which indicates a javanese practice of communitary work, but which sense in Timor is that of the mere forced labour.

This programme of re-housing has been associated by the Indonesians to their global plan of transmigration, being applied for some years in the whole archipelago.

It was in 1905 that, under the Dutch Colonial Authorities the first population migrations were started with the aim of deminishing the demogratic pressure in Java and colonizing the external Islands of the archipelago . More recently, such movements follow a systematic plan, financed by West countries and international financing institutions (12) according to the current Indonesian quinquennial plan, 750 000 families will, within the period between 84/89, have migrated from Java "and also from Bali" to Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneu), Sulawesi (Celebs), Maluku, West Papua and East Timor.

The present population of Java is of 94 million inhabitants (the total Indonesian population is of 162 million): are 60% of the population concentrated in 7% of the territory, with one of the highest demographic densities of the world. Attention has been drawn to the fact that a transmigration over a period of the thre and a half million people will not in itself solve the problem of overpopulation in Java.

Furthermore, this true exportation of poor javanese has on the contrary an importation by Java (which is in all senses, the centre of the Republic) of qualified people from the peripheric areas. The general secretary of Labour Department himself, a lieutenant general in the reserve, Sutopo Invono, admitted that the number of immigrants in Java is approximately the same as the number of transmigrated sent out of Java (13). The purpose of the programme will not be therefore, purely demographic, but also - and, in the case of critical zones such as West Papua and East Timor predominantly - of political milatary character. It is a matter of diluting the identity, the will and capacity of resistance of local communities.

In East Timor, as well as in West Papua the authorities have already started to "resettle" the territory with new villages formed by transmigrant Indonesians and Timor people dislodged from their original living places. The first "model village" (desa taladan) of this type is Tum Bibi, established in 1982 in the district of bobonaro with 50 Bali families and equal number of Timor people. Presently, two new villages of transmigration are being prepared in the district of Koralima, integrating 500 families of Bali and Java and 500 Timor families: Salele, in the subdistrict of Tilomar, and Beco, in the subdistrict of Suai (14).

the transmigrants are considered as "model peasants" (petani teladan) of whom the authorities expect to reform (i.e. "Indesianizing" them) the local methods of agricultural produc-

tion: of notice is their participation in programmes of rice production according to new techniques financed by the United States Agency for International Development (15).

The occupiers are albeit building an economy of plantation, not only of traditional products (coffee, sandlewood) as new crops - the majority of the investments, mainly in communication means, seams to go in that direction (one of the first tarred roads build after the occupation links Dili to Ermera, in the coffee region). An economy of plantation which benefits in first place the type of Indonesian firm associating businness and milatary men, of which the Timor example is P.T. Denok Hernandes International, who holds in East Timor the monopoly of coffee and sandlewood buying from the producer and of exporting.

Even the Committee VIII of the DPR (Indonesian Parliament), in its report on East Timor, states that this territory faces severe social problems: "More that 30% of the population is under the line of poverty. Almost 70% of the houses are too modest and do not provide the conditions of health and comfort". Almost 20% of the population still live "completely isolated on the hills and mountains". 60% of the area is not prepared for utilization of public transports (16).

Re-settlement and transmigration are part of the instruments which Indonesia is using in order to control the popular resistance. This confirms the diagnosis already made in 1982 by Peter Hastins in the Australian newspaper SYDNEY MORNING HERALD:"The transmigrasi policy aims first of all at creating

a sanitary belt in areas where the Indonesian Government is not sure of its local loyalties and wishes to put an end to the activities of the local dissidents ..."

GENOCIDE AND INDONESIATION

The Indonesian Govrnment understood that, in order to turn East Timor into the "27th Province" of the Republic, it would be necessary to bend completely the maubere people, extinguish its culture to the last flame, its right to exist as a living community.

The collective massacres, the murders, the arrests and tortures, the disappearances, the deportations, the permanent intimidation and surveillance, the 200 thousand Timor people killed since 1975 are proof of that.

Even the Indonisian military men recognize that "members of GPK (17) come from the children of the people and bring with them the people's ambitions". Therefore "the population trusts them more than the Indonesian army"(18)

For the gerrilla men, who have "a fighting spirit very dedicated, confidence, spirit of sacrifice and quickness in action", the occupying forces know that "it is a fact that the GPK continues to exist thnks to the inhabitants who, in the pacified regions, provinde them with support in the logistic plan: informations, hiding out places." (19)

It has been, mainly, the civil population to endure the methods of terror brought about by the Indonesian army. Completely

surrounded in the towns or in the "strategic villages", forbiden to move about or to cultivate the land, scarcity and desease win it over easily. Those who have family in the Resistance or become suspects of keeping any contact with it or of supporting it, suffer retaliations which, at its best, lead to torture and not seldom to death. Entire villages are distroyed by bombings.

It is also being noticed that repression reaches more and more even the Timor people who cooperate, by option or by obligation, with the occupying power. The youngesters integrated in the military or para-military Indonesian structure are killed, arrested, tortured, made to disappear, for suspition of support to FRETILIN. "They are members of the Indonesian army in their appearance but, in fact, they continue to simpathize with GPK:" (20)

The repressive mechanisms are numerous, diversified, and they invade all the daily life. Censure, the military ostentation, the total insecurity, the suspitious atmosphere and the lack of justice leave their mark in each day and each Timor person. The Indonesian regime has a long experience of repression, since the coup in 1965, and this experience is now fully applied in East Timor. The Indonesian secret military books give vespecific instructions:

- "it is necessary to record all the peasants, above all the one who, in the past, supported FRETILIN";
- "It is necessary to watch the employees who, from time to time, express themselves in a negative way";
- "It is necessary to find the persons who may stil maintain

relations with the GPK, through methods of daily vigilance";

- "It is necessary to make a complete list of the village inhabitants, recording their occupation";
- "It is necessary to consolidate the control of the populations of the villages";
- "It is necessary to appoint one informer per each ten families";
- "Each inhabitant should have a pass to leave the village";
- "It is necessary to organize patrols in order to avoid unauthorized meetings";
- "It is necessary to forbid the inhabitants form going to work alone on the fields". (21)

At the same time, a birth control program was started in 1980. According to some known data, it is estimated that almost all women within the fertile age groups are included in this program. There are presently 183 birth control centers serving 442 villages, and the authorities expect to have 250 centers in operation in 1985/86. The Provincial centre of Dili, inaugurated in 1985, was financed in 95% by the World Bank. If we compare this data with the number of existing health centers and delegations in the territory -- 28 and 101 respectively, we can easily understand the purpose of this program of birth control.

As far as education is concerned, the Indonesian propaganda attempts to illustrate with figures the progress after the occupation: 984 new class rooms and recuperation of 342 old rooms between 1976 and 1982; 95.000 students and 2.500 teachers on the several educational levels in 1982, etc. But

the figures mean nothing regarding the reality of an education in which it is obvious that Indonesia should invest considerably.

The Indonesian educational effort is paralel to the gradual disactivation of the traditional system of Catholic education. The number of students in Catholic schools has declined a lot, as well as that of teachers. In order to compensate the lack of Catholic agents, teachers have been recruited (Indonesians) from West Timor but the quality of their teaching is considered to be weak. Conversely to the teachers of Government schools, the Catholic teacher do not benefit from the public servant statute - and that is another factor which discouragdges any education system with autonomy in relation to the regime.

The Government schools programs and curriculums are intirely Idonesian and the education language is the Indonesian BAHASA. There is considerable insistence in political indoctrination and the learning of PANCASILA (basic principles of the Indonesian State). As far as physical education is concerned, it is associated to the activities of PRAMUKA, the official scouts movement, of military orientation.

Paralel to this effort of assimilation of the youth, there has been a reinforcement of propaganda means directed to the Timor community, from this distribution of radios to the foundation of new broadcasting stations of TV (in Maliana, Baucau, Viqueque, Lospalos, Dili) and the installation of TV sets in public places. The aim is obviously to implant

new cultural values and a new communication language to the Timor population. But the testimonies coming from the interior state the permanence of the traditional values. Thus, in a Dcoument of a Timor Christian, dated 20/2/85, it is stated that "in all Timor Portuguese is still spoken". Refuting the pretenses of the Indonesian propaganda, the author of the document states that "to say that the illiterate majority has never taken notice of the Portuguese culture is mere mistake of historic fact. That influence has given place now to the ideal of self-determination, continuing to come through in the customary behaviour of acting, mentality, attitudes, language, socialized moral values".

Behind the hundreds of informations which come to our knowledge, there is a violently shaken society, forced to a daily lide and to references which were never theirs. The families are destroyed and separated; the villages bombarded, compulsively abandoned; the "strategic villages", at the road side, where the population is concentrated and watched; the lands claimed by the invaders; travelling prohibitted; the occupyer's language and culture are imposed; the new administrative, military and para-military structures are imposed by Jakarta; the arrival of Javanese through the programs of transmigration; the denial of work, of public health and of education to whom is not willing to acquire the Indonesian nationality; the forced birth control. This is a people they want to extinguish, this is a people who is bravely resisting aniquilation.

Notas

(1) Actualmente embaixador da Austrália em Jacarta
(2) *Der Spiegel*, 29 de Abril 1985
(3) Carta de Monsenhor Belo à Comissão Justiça e Paz francesa, 5 de Dezembro 1984
(4) *Country Reports on Human Rights Pratices for 1984*, Department of State, Fevereiro de 1985
(5) *East-Timor after integration*, Dept. of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1983
(6) J. Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, Queensland, 1983
(7) Cit. por Carmel Budiardjo e Liem Soei Liong, *War against Timor*, Londres, 1984, p. 12
(8) *Mensagem de Saudação*, FRETILIN, Fevereiro de 1985
(9) O aparelho das Forças Armadas indonésias está em fase de estruturação
(10) Número ref. na publicação indonésia *Tempo* de 22.1.83, segundo C. Budiardjo e L. S. Liong, ob. cit., p. 101
(11) Documento subscrito pelo Administrador Apostólico e pelo Conselho Presbiterial da Diocese de Dili, datado de 1.1.1985
(12) O financiamento estrangeiro do plano de transmigração totaliza 600 milhões de dólares US, dos quais 400 milhões por conta do Banco Mundial. Outros financiadores: Banco de Desenvolvimento Asiático, Banco de Desenvolvimento Islâmico, CEE, ONU, RFA, França, Holanda, EUA
(13) *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 24 de Abril 1985
(14) *Informatie - Feiten en Meningen*, Amesterdão, Ano 10, nº 5, Dezembro 1984/ /Janeiro 1985, p. 7
(15) C. Budiardjo e L. S. Liong, ob. cit.
(16) *Suara Karya*, 27 de Abril 1985
(17) O GPK é o "movimento para a desestabilização da segurança", nome dado pelos militares indonésios à FRETILIN
(18) Documentos secretos do exército indonésio de 1982 autenticados pela Amnistia Internacional
(19) Idem
(20) Idem
(21) Idem